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National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C. Bollingen Series XXXV:45. Edited by Henry Hardy. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999. Pp. xvi + 171.  Cloth. $19.95. 
 
Originally delivered in the spring of 1965 and subsequently broadcast several times over 
the BBC, Berlin’s lectures on romanticism have long been esteemed by his admirers. Berlin 
nevertheless resisted their publication, hoping one day to write a book on romanticism. His 
literary executor Henry Hardy reports, however, that “not so much as a sentence of the intended 
work was ever written” (x). Thus Hardy’s edition of these lectures constitutes Berlin’s most 
extended reflection on a theme that loomed large in his understanding of the modern world: the 
romantic critique of the Enlightenment.  
Surprisingly few romantics actually appear in these pages. Those who do arrive late, 
linger briefly, and are usually German. Fichte enters on page 88, followed by Schelling (97) and 
the Schlegel brothers (104), with brief appearances by E. T. A. Hoffman and Johann Ludwig 
Tieck (114-6). Only in his closing ruminations on the impact of romanticism does Berlin cast a 
glance at Byron, Chateaubriand, and Sir Walter Scott.  Most of the book explores what Berlin 
takes to be romanticism’s “roots,” which he locates in a few eighteenth-century German writers 
who, when romanticism finally burst upon the scene, were either disgusted by it (Jacobi, Schiller, 
and Goethe) or dead (Hamann).  A few years Berlin made these proto-romantics the charter 
members of the movement he dubbed “the Counter-Enlightenment” — a concept that would have 
a considerable career of its own. Berlin’s concern is thus less with romanticism per se than “with 
the revolution of which romanticism, at any rate in some of its guises, is the strongest expression 
and symptom” [xiii].  
As Berlin saw it, this revolution involved a rejection of the idea that 1) “all genuine 
questions can be answered, ” 2) “all these answers are knowable,” and 3) “all these answers must 
be compatible with one another” (21-2). Upon these three principles, he insists, “the whole 
Western tradition rested” (21), and their rejection constitutes “the greatest single shift in the 
consciousness of the West” (1). Berlin holds that the Enlightenment left these principles 
unshaken. It was the romantics who questioned the “ruinous” belief that “there is one single 
solution to all human ills” (which carries the insidious corollary that “you must impose this 
solution no matter what cost”) and thus laid the foundations for “liberalism, toleration, decency 
and the appreciation of the imperfections of life” (146-7), causes which are usually associated 
(wrongly, according to Berlin) with the Enlightenment. 
These arguments will not be unfamiliar to those who know Berlin’s works.  Reading him 
is a bit like listening to Vivaldi: taken individually, his essays are clever, vigorously argued, and 
elegantly crafted; but reading them in sequence soon leads to a nagging sense of having heard it 
all before.  Berlin’s work was animated by an awareness of the diversity of plausible answers that 
could be given to the question of how life should be lived and by an impassioned defense of this 
plurality of possibilities against the illusion of an ultimate solution. One can admire the defense 
of liberalism that Berlin drew from these convictions and yet have reservations about the 
historical accuracy of his account of the relationship between romanticism and the 
Enlightenment. It is hard to see Hamann as a supporter of pluralism and harder still to see the 
philosophes — who rejected the dogmatic esprit de systèm in favor of an experimentalist esprit 
systématique — as oblivious to the multiplicity of ways in which good lives could be lived.  
Lessing’s views on religious questions were a good deal more skeptical and open-ended than 
Jacobi’s.  Fichte and Schelling sought to bring a greater systematic coherence to Kant’s 
philosophy, not to dismantle it.  Once one moves from general claims about “romanticism” and 
“the Enlightenment” to assess specific thinkers, the picture becomes a good deal messier than 
Berlin lets on. Early romantics, as Manfred Frank and Frederick Beiser have stressed, share much 
with late Aufklärers, just as Joseph Priestley points the way to William Blake’s New Jerusalem. 
The fox, as Berlin explained in the most famous version of his dichotomy, “knows many 
things” while the hedgehog “knows one big thing.” Those who first heard Berlin’s torrent of 
words, bristling with strange names and biting ironies, must have felt themselves in the presence 
of a master fox. Yet in black and white they read like a hedgehog’s guide to the eighteenth 
century. A complex and fascinating age winds up shoe-horned onto one side of a familiar 
dichotomy.  Those interested in tracing the roots of Berlin’s political vision will find much of 
interest here. Those hoping to learn about the relationship between romanticism and the 
Enlightenment would be advised to seek out foxier historians. 
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